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ABSTRACT
Vehicular networks are likely to become the most relevant
form of mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we address
the security of these networks. We provide a detailed threat
analysis and devise an appropriate security architecture. We
also describe some major design decisions still to be made,
which in some cases have more than mere technical impli-
cations. We provide a set of security protocols, we show
that they protect privacy and we analyze their robustness,
and we carry out a quantitative assessment of the proposed
solution.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection
General Terms
Design, Security
Keywords
vehicular ad hoc networks, security
1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, road vehicles were the realm of mechani-
cal engineers. But with the plummeting costs of electronic
components and the permanent willingness of the manufac-
turers to increase road safety and to differentiate themselves
from their competitors, vehicles are becoming “computers
on wheels”, or rather “computer networks on wheels”. For
example, a modern car typically contains several tens of in-
terconnected processors; it usually has a central computer
as well as an Event Data Recorder, reminiscent of the “black
boxes” used in avionics. Optionally, it also has a GPS re-
ceiver, a navigation system, and one or several radars.
Manufacturers are about to make a quantum step in terms
of vehicular IT, by letting vehicles communicate with each
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other and with roadside infrastructure; in this way, vehicles
will dramatically increase their awareness of their environ-
ment, thereby increasing safety and optimizing traffic. Re-
searchers have investigated many aspects of vehicular com-
munications [7, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 29, 32, 33, 34]. In the
US, the FCC has allocated a bandwidth of 75MHz for these
applications, usually referred to as DSRC (Dedicated Short
Range Communications) [3]; similar initiatives are expected
in other parts of the world. Significant progress has been
made on the definition of the MAC and physical layer pro-
tocols; consensus is emerging around a customized version
of IEEE 802.11.
Considering the tremendous benefits expected from ve-
hicular communications and the huge number of vehicles
(hundreds of millions worldwide), it is clear that vehicular
communications are likely to become the most relevant real-
ization of mobile ad hoc networks. The appropriate integra-
tion of on-board computers and positioning devices, such as
GPS receivers along with communication capabilities, open
tremendous business opportunities, but also raise formidable
research challenges.
One of these challenges is security; very little attention
[7, 15, 18, 34] has been devoted so far to the security of
vehicular networks. Yet, security is crucial. For example, it
is essential to make sure that life-critical information cannot
be inserted or modified by an attacker; likewise, the system
should be able to help establish the liability of drivers; but
at the same time, it should protect as far as possible the
privacy of the drivers and passengers.
These concerns may look similar to those encountered in
other communication networks, but they are not. Indeed,
the size of the network, the speed of the vehicles, the rele-
vance of their geographic position, the very sporadic connec-
tivity between them, and the unavoidably slow deployment
make the problem very novel and challenging. The purpose
of this paper is to bring a first response to this challenge.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2,
we present the state of the art. In Section 3 we describe the
system model that we subsequently use to provide a threat
analysis in Section 4 and the corresponding solutions in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6 we analyze the security of the proposed
protocols and in Section 7 we address implementation issues.
Finally, in Section 8 we discuss related issues and Section 9
concludes the paper.
2. STATE OF THE ART
VANETs (Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks) are an emerging
research area. Currently, most of the research is focused on
the development of a suitable MAC layer, as well as poten-
tial applications ranging from collision avoidance to onboard
infotainment services. But both academics and the indus-
try have so far largely overlooked the subject of security
in VANETs, postponing it to later phases of research and
development.
In fact, there are very few academic publications describ-
ing the security architecture of VANETs [7, 18, 34]; none
of them proposes specific protocols or considers practical is-
sues such as key sizes and authentication delays. The use of
digital signatures in the vehicular environment is discussed
in [15]. Software frameworks for telematics are proposed in
[10, 11]. Some recent papers [16] focus on particular subjects
in vehicular security without defining the big picture where
the proposed solutions would fit. Very related to VANET
security is the security of the electronic systems in a vehicle
that are actually responsible for transporting or generating
the data before it is sent. A security architecture based on a
PKI for digital tachograph1 systems is proposed in [14]. The
security problems of automotive bus systems are pinpointed
in [31].
The most prominent industrial effort in this domain is
carried out by the Car 2 Car Communication Consortium
[1] and several projects such as NOW [2] in Europe, and the
DSRC [3] consortium, especially the IEEE P1556 Working
Group (Security and Privacy of Vehicle and Roadside Com-
munications including Smart Card Communications), in the
USA.
Some commercial products already make use of vehicular
communication without taking the security aspect into ac-
count. For example, insurance companies install black boxes
(similar to the Event Data Recorders in this paper) in cars
to collect their usage data (e.g., travelled distance) and to
calculate insurance costs accordingly. Another related ap-
plication is GPS car tracking (discussed in Section 8).
3. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the distinguishing properties
of VANETs (Fig. 1) in order to shape later the problem
statement. Further, we describe a basic safety messaging
protocol to be used as a reference in later sections.
3.1 System assumptions
To be future-compatible, the following assumptions are
based mainly on specifications of upcoming products.
3.1.1 Network model
The communicating nodes in VANETs are either vehi-
cles or base stations. Vehicles can be private (belonging
to individuals or private companies) or public (i.e., public
transportation means, e.g., buses, and public services such
as police cars). Base stations can belong to the government
or to private service providers. We assume a communication
channel supported by an IEEE 802.11-like technology.
Given that the majority of the network nodes will consist
of vehicles, the network dynamics will be characterized by
quasi-permanent mobility, high speeds, and (in most cases)
very short connection times between neighbors (e.g., in the
case of crossing vehicles). For example, on highways vehicle
speeds are usually higher than 80km/h (with relative speeds
1A tachograph is a device used to record the speed and
duration of trips in a motor vehicle.
Figure 1: A VANET consists of vehicles and road-
side base stations that exchange primarily safety
messages to give the drivers the time to react to
life-endangering events.
equal to twice these values), and in some countries (e.g.,
Germany) are not even upper bounded. Another aspect
of network dynamics is that vehicle trajectories are mostly
well defined by the roads, which incurs some advantages (for
message dissemination) and disadvantages (for privacy).
The scale of VANETs is another feature that sets them
apart. With hundreds of millions of nodes distributed ev-
erywhere, VANETs are likely to be the largest real-world
mobile ad hoc network. But communication in this network
will be mainly local, thus partitioning the network and mak-
ing it scalable.
An advantage of VANETs over “usual” ad hoc networks is
that vehicles provide relatively sufficient computational and
power resources, especially taking into account Moore’s law
and the related improvement of computing platforms in the
next few years. As mentioned in the Introduction, a typical
vehicle in a VANET will host several tens or even hundreds
of microprocessors, an EDR (Event Data Recorder) that can
be used for crash reconstruction, and a GPS (Global Posi-
tioning System) receiver (or a similar system, such as Dif-
ferential GPS or Galileo) that will provide position and a
clock. It should be noted that the existence of a GPS-like
device is not mandatory for supporting security in VANETs;
we will describe alternative options.
VANETs are expected to be deployed over the next decade
to achieve considerable penetration only around 2014 [23,
25]. Nevertheless, the network should become partially op-
erational with the release of the first products, i.e., in the
next couple of years. This means that the basic functions
of VANETs and the related security mechanisms should be
available even with low market penetration, and especially
without relying on the existence of an infrastructure (which
will take a longer time to deploy due to administrative and
installation costs).
3.1.2 Application categories
There are many applications envisioned for VANETs, most
of which are proposed by the vehicle manufacturers. Al-
Table 1: Message classes and properties
Privacy protection
Class\Property Legitimacy
Against other individuals Against the police
Real-time constraints
Traffic information X X X
General safety messages X X X X
Liability-related messages X X X
though the spectrum of these applications is very wide rang-
ing (from the realistic to the futuristic) [3], we have divided
the applications into two major categories:
1. Safety-related applications, such as collision avoidance,
cooperative driving, and traffic optimization. The com-
mon characteristic of this category is the relevance to
life-critical situations where the existence or lack of a
service may affect life-endangering accidents. Hence
the security of this category is mandatory, since the
proper operation of any of these applications should
be guaranteed regardless of the presence of security
threats.
2. Other applications, including payment services (e.g.,
toll collection), location-based services (e.g., finding
the closest fuel station), infotainment (e.g., Internet
access). Obviously, security is also required in this ap-
plication category, especially in the case of payment
services. But in this paper we address the security
aspects of safety-related applications because they are
the most specific to the automotive domain and be-
cause they raise the most challenging problems.
3.1.3 Safety messages
As explained in the previous section, we consider only
public safety applications. In this context, we can classify
the safety messages into three classes, based on their prop-
erties related to privacy and real-time constraints, as shown
in Table 1. Traffic information messages are used to dissem-
inate traffic conditions in a given region and thus affect pub-
lic safety only indirectly (by preventing potential accidents
due to congestion); hence they are not time-critical. Gen-
eral safety-related messages are used by public safety appli-
cations such as cooperative driving and collision avoidance
and hence should satisfy stringent constraints such as an up-
per bound on the delivery delay. Liability-related messages
are distinguished from the previous class because they are
exchanged in liability-related situations such as accidents.
Therefore, the liability of the message originator should be
determined by revealing his identity to the law enforcement
authorities. This classification of messages will be useful
later in describing the attacks on VANETs.
A common property of all the message classes is that they
are broadcast and mainly standalone (i.e., there is no con-
tent dependency among them like in media streams). The
content of a typical safety message includes position, speed,
direction, and acceleration of the vehicle, in addition to data
specific to traffic events (e.g., congestion notification or ac-
cident). If the sender faces an abnormal situation (e.g., an
accident), these data help receivers compute their positions
with respect to the sender and determine if they are in dan-
ger. The message does not necessarily contain explicit ID
information.
An important feature of ad hoc networks is multihopping.
But according to the DSRC specifications and because of
their broadcast nature, safety messages are transmitted over
a single-hop with a sufficient power to warn vehicles in a
range of 10 seconds travel time, thus eliminating the need for
multihop. Nevertheless, some form of multihop still exists:
vehicles that receive warning messages estimate whether the
reported problems can also affect their followers; in this case,
they forward the message to them.
3.1.4 Trust
A key element in a security system is trust. This is partic-
ularly emphasized in vehicular networks because of the high
liability required from safety applications and consequently
the nodes running these applications. Due to the large num-
ber of independent network members (i.e., they do not be-
long to the same organization) and the presence of the hu-
man factor, it is highly probable that misbehavior will arise.
In addition, consumers are becoming increasingly concerned
about their privacy. Drivers do not make an exception, es-
pecially because the lack of privacy and the related poten-
tial of tracking may result in high financial charges on the
drivers (e.g., due to occasional overspeeding). As a result,
we assume a low level of trust in vehicles, as well as service
provider base stations. Beside drivers and service providers,
there will be a considerable presence of governmental au-
thorities in VANETs. But due to the reasons stated above,
trust in any of these authorities will be only partial (e.g.,
a given police officer may abuse his authority if given full
trust). To gain full trust, several authorities will have to
cooperate as will be sketched in Section 5.
3.2 Basic safety messaging protocol
Because the research on VANETs and their applications is
still in its beginnings, there are few papers in the literature
that describe protocols for safety messaging [32, 33]. To bet-
ter describe the security solutions introduced in this paper,
we describe in the following a simple protocol inspired from
[33] for safety messaging to use as an example reference in
later sections.
• In compliance with the DSRC specifications [3], we as-
sume that each vehicle V periodically sends messages
over a single hop every 300 ms within a range of 10
s travel time (the minimum range is 110 m and the
maximum is 300 m).
• The inter-message interval drops to 100 ms and the
range to 15 m if the vehicles are very slow or stopped
(i.e., their speed is less than 10 miles/h or ≈ 16 km/h).
• Vehicles take decisions based on the received messages
and may transmit new ones. For example, if V receives
an emergency warning from another vehicle W and,
Figure 2: In this example bogus information attack,
colluding attackers (A2 and A3) disseminate false
information to affect the decisions of other vehicles
(V) and thus clear the way of attacker A1.
based on their mutual positions, estimates that it is
also in danger, it sends out its own warning messages.
4. ATTACKS ON VEHICULAR NETWORKS
In this section we describe the security threats facing ve-
hicular networks. Since we cannot envision all the possible
attacks that will be mounted in the future on VANETs, we
will provide a general classification of attacks substantiated
by a list of attacks that we have identified so far. But before
describing the attacks, it is important to define the attacker,
which we do in the following section.
4.1 Attacker’s model
To classify the capacities of an attacker, we have defined
three dimensions:
1. Insider vs. Outsider. The insider is an authenticated
member of the network that can communicate with
other members. As will be explained later, this means
that he possesses a certified public key. The outsider
is considered by the network members as an intruder
and hence is limited in the diversity of attacks he can
mount (especially by misusing network-specific proto-
cols).
2. Malicious vs. Rational. A malicious attacker seeks no
personal benefits from the attacks and aims to harm
the members or the functionality of the network. Hence,
he may employ any means disregarding corresponding
costs and consequences. On the contrary, a rational
attacker seeks personal profit and hence is more pre-
dictable in terms of the attack means and the attack
target.
3. Active vs. Passive. An active attacker can generate
packets or signals, whereas a passive attacker contents
himself with eavesdropping on the wireless channel.
Inspired by the model in [17] we characterize an attacker
by the tuple Membership.Motivation.Method where Mem-
bership stands for Insider (Im) or Outsider (On), Motivation
for Malicious (M ) or Rational (R), and Method for Active
(A) or Passive (P); m and n indicate the numbers of I and
O nodes that the attacker controls, respectively. These two
numbers also cover the notion of collusion. For example,
an attacker I2.R.A controls two networks members, behaves
rationally, and mounts active attacks. A star (“*”) indicates
that the corresponding field can take any value.
4.2 Specific attacks
As this paper is concerned with vehicular networks, we
consider only the attacks perpetrated against messages rather
than the vehicles, as the physical security of vehicle electron-
ics (e.g., against hardware tampering) is out of the scope of
this paper.
1. Bogus information (Fig. 2): Attackers are Im.R.A
(m indicates any positive integer) and diffuse wrong
information in the network to affect the behavior of
other drivers (e.g., to divert traffic from a given road
and thus free it for themselves).
2. Cheating with positioning information: Attackers in
this case are also Im.R.A, and use this attack to al-
ter their perceived position, speed, direction, etc. in
order to escape liability, notably in the case of an acci-
dent. In the worst case, colluding attackers can clone
each other, but this would require retrieving the secu-
rity material (which should be stored in tamper-proof
hardware as discussed in Section 5.3) and having full
trust between the attackers.
3. ID disclosure of other vehicles in order to track their
location. This is the Big Brother scenario, where a
global observer can monitor trajectories of targeted ve-
hicles and use this data for a range of purposes (e.g.,
the way some car rental companies track their own
cars). To monitor, the global observer can leverage
on the roadside infrastructure or the vehicles around
its target (e.g., by using a virus that infects neighbors
of the target and collects the required data). The at-
tacker is passive. We assume that the attacker does
not make use of cameras, physical pursuit, or onboard
tracking devices to uncover the identity of his target;
otherwise, the tracking problem becomes simpler but
also more expensive and tied to few specific targets,
and it can be done anyhow based on existing license
plates. In addition, we assume that physical-layer at-
tacks (e.g., using radio fingerprinting [27]) are solved
by appropriate physical layer techniques such as radio
transmitters that randomize fingerprints.
4. Denial of Service: The attacker is ∗.M.A and may
want to bring down the VANET or even cause an ac-
cident. Example attacks include channel jamming and
aggressive injection of dummy messages.
5. Masquerade: The attacker actively pretends to be an-
other vehicle by using false identities and can be mo-
tivated by malicious or rational objectives.
5. HOW TO SECURE VANETS
In the next sections, we propose a set of security solutions
to be deployed in vehicular networks. We attempt to con-
sider all the possible options but take into account both the
current state of the art and the long-term viability of these
networks.
5.1 Requirements
A security system for safety messaging in a VANET should
satisfy the following requirements:
• Authentication: Vehicle reactions to events should be
based on legitimate messages (i.e., generated by legit-
imate senders). Therefore we need to authenticate the
senders of these messages.
• Verification of data consistency : The legitimacy of
messages also encompasses their consistency with sim-
ilar ones (those generated in close space and time), be-
cause the sender can be legitimate while the message
contains false data.
• Availability : Even assuming a robust communication
channel, some attacks (e.g., DoS by jamming) can
bring down the network. Therefore, availability should
be also supported by alternative means.
• Non-repudiation: Drivers causing accidents should be
reliably identified; a sender should not be able to deny
the transmission of a message (it may be crucial for
investigation to determine the correct sequence and
content of messages exchanged before the accident).
• Privacy : People are increasingly wary of Big Brother
enabling technologies. Hence, the privacy of drivers
against unauthorized observers should be guaranteed.
• Real-time constraints: At the very high speeds typi-
cal in VANETs, strict time constraints should be re-
spected.
5.2 Digital signatures as a building block
As emphasized in Section 5.1, message legitimacy is manda-
tory to protect VANETs from outsiders, as well as misbe-
having insiders. But since safety messages will not contain
any sensitive information (Section 3.1.3 describes the con-
tents of a typical message), confidentiality is not required.
As a result, the exchange of safety messages in a VANET
needs authentication but not encryption.
Symmetric authentication mechanisms usually induce less
overhead per message (not counting the handshake needed
to establish a shared key) than their asymmetric counter-
parts. But digital signatures are a better choice in the
VANET setting, because safety messages are typically stan-
dalone, as mentioned in Section 3.1.3 and should be sent to
receivers as fast as possible. In fact, a preliminary hand-
shake is not acceptable and actually creates more overhead.
In addition, given the huge amount of network members and
the sporadic connectivity to authentication servers, a PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure) is the most suitable way for im-
plementing authentication.
5.2.1 Securing messages
Under the PKI solution, each vehicle will be assigned a
public/private key pair (we will elaborate more on the na-
ture of these keys in the next section). Before a vehicle sends
a safety message, it signs it2 with its private key and in-
cludes the CA’s (Certification Authority, discussed in 5.4.3)
certificate as follows:
V → ∗ : M, SigPrKV [M |T ], CertV
where V designates the sending vehicle, ∗ represents all the
message receivers, M is the message, | is the concatenation
operator, and T is the timestamp to ensure message fresh-
ness (it can be obtained from the security device introduced
in Section 5.3). It should be noted that using nonces instead
of timestamps is not desirable because of the burden of the
inherent preliminary handshake where the communicating
parties exchange the nonces; using sequence numbers also
incurs overhead as they need to be maintained. CertV is
the public key certificate of V and will be described later.
The receivers of the message have to extract and verify
the public key of V using the certificate and then verify V ’s
signature using its certified public key. In order to do this,
the receiver should have the public key of the CA, which can
be preloaded as described below.
If the message is sent in an emergency context, which
means that it belongs to the liability-related class, this mes-
sage should be stored (including the signature and the cer-
tificate) in the EDR for further potential investigations in
the emergency.
5.3 Tamper-proof device
The use of secret information such as private keys incurs
the need for a tamper-proof device in each vehicle. In ad-
dition to storing the secret information, this device will be
also responsible for signing outgoing messages. To reduce
the risk of its compromise by attackers, the device should
have its own battery, which can be recharged from the vehi-
cle, and clock, which can be securely resynchronized, when
passing by a trusted roadside base station. The access to
this device should be restricted to authorized people. For
example, cryptographic keys can be renewed at the periodic
technical checkup of the vehicle. Several commercial prod-
ucts have these features, e.g., [6].
5.4 Key management
We will address below the issues of cryptographic key dis-
tribution, certification, and revocation.
5.4.1 Cryptographic information types
To be part of a VANET, each vehicle has to store the
following cryptographic information:
1. An electronic identity called an Electronic License Plate
(ELP) [18] issued by a government, or alternatively an
Electronic Chassis Number (ECN ) issued by the vehi-
cle manufacturer. These identities (further referred to
simply by ELP) should be unique and cryptograph-
ically verifiable (this can be achieved by attaching a
certificate issued by the CA to the identity) in order
to identify vehicles to the police in case this is required
(usually, identities are hidden from the police). Simi-
larly to the physical license plates, the ELP should be
2The message is actually hashed before being signed.
changed (i.e., reloaded in the vehicle) when the owner
changes or moves, e.g., to a different region or country.
2. Anonymous key pairs that are used to preserve privacy.
An anonymous key pair is a public/private key pair
that is authenticated by the CA but contains neither
information about nor public relationship with (i.e.,
this relationship cannot be discovered by an observer
without a special authorization) the actual identity of
the vehicle (i.e., its ELP). Yet this anonymity is condi-
tional for liability purposes as will be explained later.
Normally, a vehicle will possess a set of anonymous
keys to prevent tracking.
5.4.2 Key bootstrapping and rekeying
Since the ELP is the electronic equivalent of the physi-
cal license plate, it should be “installed” in the vehicle us-
ing a similar procedure, which means that the governmental
transportation authority will preload the ELP at the time
of vehicle registration (in the case of the ECN, the manufac-
turer is responsible for its installation at production time).
Anonymous keys are preloaded by the transportation au-
thority or the manufacturer, but with different consequences
as discussed in the next section. Moreover, while ELPs are
fixed and should accompany the vehicle for a long duration
(potentially its life cycle), anonymous key sets have to be pe-
riodically renewed after all the keys have been used or their
lifetimes have expired. This renewal can be done during
the periodic vehicle checkup (typically yearly) or by similar
procedures.
In addition to the ELP and anonymous keys, each vehicle
should be preloaded with the CA’s public key.
5.4.3 Key certification
Certification Authorities (CA) will be responsible for is-
suing key certificates to vehicles. Two solutions can be en-
visioned:
1. Governmental transportation authorities: Vehicles will
be registered in different countries by the correspond-
ing transportation authorities (which are usually re-
gional). The advantage of this option is that the cer-
tification procedure will be under the direct control of
the concerned authority. Although the ELP and keys
of each vehicle are certified by a regional authority in a
given country, vehicles from different regions or coun-
tries should be able to authenticate each other. This
problem is usually solved by including the certificate
chain leading to a common authority, but in the case
of VANETs this would tremendously increase the mes-
sage overhead. This certificate chain can be replaced
by a single certificate by making the CA of the trav-
elling vehicle’s transit or destination region re-certify
the ELP and the anonymous keys of the vehicle after
verifying them with the public key of the CA that reg-
istered the vehicle. This requires the installation of
base stations at the region borders.
2. Vehicle manufacturers: Certificates can also be issued
by vehicle manufacturers, given their limited number
and the trust already endowed in them. The advan-
tage of this approach is reduced overhead. In fact,
each vehicle will need to store a small number of man-
ufacturer public keys in order to be able to verify any
other vehicle it encounters, which is not the case if
the CA is a local authority. The disadvantage is that
non-governmental institutions will be involved in law-
enforcement mechanisms.
For example, assuming keys are certified by a certain CA,
a certificate CertV [PuKi] of the i
th anonymous key PuKi
of a vehicle V should include at least the following:
CertV [PuKi] = PuKi|SigPrKCA [PuKi|IDCA]
where PrKCA is CA’s private key and IDCA is the unique
ID of CA.
5.4.4 Key revocation
We consider two key revocation scenarios, depending on
the information compromised by the attacker:
1. All the cryptographic material belonging to a vehicle
is compromised. To avoid the overhead of revoking
all the keys of this vehicle, the CA will revoke them
by sending secure revocation messages to the tamper-
proof device.
2. A particular key of a vehicle’s key set is compromised.
In this case, sending a revocation message to the tamper-
proof device for each revoked key would cause a large
overhead. There are many other key revocation op-
tions in the literature [35], but they either require per-
manent online connectivity to the CA or are not suit-
able for the vehicular environment. Therefore, we opt
for using short key certificate lifetimes that will make
key certificates expire, thus revoking the keys. Using
this approach requires large storage space on the ve-
hicles, because keys should be frequently replaced by
new ones. Although this would be a problem for re-
source constrained scenarios, vehicles are resourceful
enough to satisfy this requirement. We will illustrate
this with numerical examples in Section 7.1.
5.5 Anonymous public keys
There are several types of privacy. As safety messages
will not contain any secret data about their senders, vehicle
owners will be only concerned about identity and location
privacy. To respond to these concerns, we propose the use
of anonymous public keys that we detail in this section.
5.5.1 Identity and location privacy
Even though anonymous keys do not contain any publicly
known relationship to the true identity of the key holders,
privacy can still be hijacked by logging the messages con-
taining a given key and thus tracking the sender until dis-
covering his identity (e.g., by associating him with his place
of living).
Therefore, anonymous keys should be changed in such a
way that a pervasive observer cannot track the owner of the
keys. The downside of this approach is that a vehicle will
have to store a large key and certificate set (depending on
the key changing frequency). In Section 6.2 we will propose a
variable-frequency key changing algorithm that can preserve
privacy and minimizes the key storage space.
5.5.2 Conditional anonymity
Privacy preservation is a requirement for deploying vehic-
ular safety applications. But safety and the implied liability
requirement have higher priority. Hence, anonymity should
be conditional on the scenario (e.g., if there are issues of
law enforcement or national security, anonymity should be
overriden). But if police (or other law enforcement entities)
are given full control over the ID disclosure process, abuse
can occur. Hence, the ID disclosure capability should be
distributed among multiple authorities (in the same way it
is done with other legal issues, such as bank account dis-
closure). For example, police should not be able to retrieve
the identity corresponding to an anonymous key without
the permission of a judge. Secret sharing [26] can be used
to technically reinforce the distribution of authorizing ma-
terial among authorities, whereby authorities share the se-
cret needed to access the database that matches true vehi-
cle identities (ELPs) with the set of their anonymous public
keys. The subject of anonymity revocation is also explored
in [19].
5.6 Authenticated session establishment
It is common practice in networks that two nodes establish
a shared session key if they need to securely communicate
for a long time. In fact, symmetric cryptographic primitives
are more efficient (in terms of time and space overhead) than
the asymmetric ones. In the context of vehicular networks,
as the trust level is equal for all legitimate certificate-holding
vehicles (because the certificate verifier actually trusts the
CA that issued this certificate), the creation of secure groups
(with a secret group key) in the network is not justified. In
addition, these groups would lose the non-repudiation prop-
erty (which means that in the case of a platoon3, an example
of VANET groups, the author of an accident would not be
identifiable). In the case of broadcast messages, a set of
approaches to improve the efficiency of authentication were
proposed in [24], but none of these protocols can simulta-
neously satisfy the non-repudiation and upper delay bound
constraints for standalone messages. As a result, safety mes-
sage authentication is better done by digitally signing each
message.
5.7 DoS resilience
DoS attacks are the nightmare of security experts, since
they are mounted with no rational purpose and hence are
very difficult to prevent, especially in a wireless medium.
To mitigate these attacks, we propose switching between
different channels or even communication technologies (e.g.,
DSRC, UTRA-TDD, or even Bluetooth for very short ranges),
if they are available, when one of them (typically DSRC)
is brought down. In the worst-case scenario (i.e., when
no means of communication between vehicles exist), the
VANET enhanced features (e.g., collision avoidance) should
automatically turn off to avoid problems until the network is
reestablished. In fact, this is likely to be the default option
in the early days of VANETs, when only a few vehicles will
have the necessary technology.
5.8 Verification by correlation
In the bogus information attack, one or several legitimate
members of the network send out false information to mis-
guide other vehicles about traffic conditions. To cope with
such misbehavior, data received from a given source should
3A group of vehicles that allows many cars to accelerate
or brake simultaneously to increase road capacity without
building additional traffic lanes.
be verified by correlating them with those received from
other sources. This is typically done by reputation-based
systems, although it is important to stress here that what
matters is the rating of the correctness of the data rather
than its source (due to high mobility, neighborhood mem-
bership will change too fast to allow for the building of the
reputation of each member), e.g., using an approach similar
to [16].
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the following we analyze how the previously proposed
solutions address the requirements stated in Section 5.1.
6.1 Compliance with the security requirements
Authentication of message legitimacy is provided by the
digital signature of the sender and the corresponding CA
certificate. The only guarantee that this provides is that
the message comes from a vehicle that was trusted, at least
when the keys were issued. Nevertheless, these mechanisms
ensure that outsiders are not able to send messages to net-
work members. Verification by correlation (Section 5.8) and
fast key revocation increase this guarantee, even though it
cannot be complete because of the specific functionality of
a given correlation algorithm and the vulnerability window
of lifetime-based key revocation schemes.
Availability can never be totally guaranteed. Yet, the
ways in which an attacker can disrupt the network service
are limited: outsiders can only mount jamming attacks.
Even in this case, channel or communication technology
switching (Section 5.7) can reduce the impact of such at-
tacks.
Non-repudiation is achieved as follows:
• Vehicles cannot claim to be other vehicles (masquerade
attack) since they interact only with their anonymous
public keys. ELPs cannot be forged because they are
unique and verifiable.
• Vehicles cannot cheat about their position and related
parameters if a secure positioning solution is used (Sec-
tion 8).
• A vehicle cannot deny having sent a message because
it is signed by an anonymous key that belongs exclu-
sively to the sender; likewise, the vehicle cannot claim
that the message was replayed because a timestamp is
included in each message.
The satisfaction of the privacy requirement is addressed in
the next section and the real-time constraints are analyzed
in Section 7.
6.2 Anonymity
In order to preserve the driver’s anonymity and minimize
the storage costs of public keys, we propose a key changing
algorithm that adapts to the vehicle speed and takes into
account key correlation by the attacker as described below.
Let us consider the typical tracking scenario where the
attacker controls stationary base stations separated by a
distance datt and captures all the received safety messages;
he can later use these data (including the public keys) to
illegally track vehicles. In addition, we assume that the
attacker can correlate two keys if the sender moves at a
constant speed in the same direction and on the same lane
Figure 3: To uncover the identity of its targets, the
attacker leverages on key correlation and the tar-
get’s transmission range.
between two observation points (e.g., given the initial posi-
tion of the target the attacker can predict its position in the
future and confirm this prediction if a message is received at
the next observation point with correct predicted speed and
position). It should be noted that the following algorithm
and analysis apply when there are at least two neighboring
targets under observation; otherwise, the tracking of a single
target becomes trivial despite the usage of any anonymity
measures.
Assume the speed of target V is vt, its transmission range
is dr, and dv is the distance over which a vehicle does not
change its speed and lane (the vulnerability window with
respect to the correlation of keys). As Fig. 3 illustrates,
the vehicle’s anonymity is vulnerable over a distance equal
to dv + 2dr. This means that it is not worth changing the
key over smaller distances because an observer can correlate
keys with high probability. This defines the lower bound on
the key changing interval Tkey:
min(Tkey) =
dv + 2dr
vt
seconds (1)
But if datt > dv +2dr, V can avoid being tracked (by chang-
ing its key) as long as it does not use the same key for a
distance equal to or longer than datt. This in turn defines
the upper bound on the key changing interval:
max(Tkey) =
datt
vt
seconds (2)
Since V does not know datt, but knows dr and dv, it can
choose a value of Tkey that is a little larger than min(Tkey).
If we denote by rm the message rate, one key should be used
for at most:
Nmsg = ⌈rm × Tkey⌉messages (3)
For example, assume datt = 2 km, rm = 3.33 msg/sec (1
message every 300 ms), dv = 30 sec ×vt (i.e., V does not
change its lane and speed over 30 sec), dr = 10 sec ×vt
(according to DSRC, the transmission range is equal to the
distance travelled in 10sec at the current speed), and vt =
100 km/h. Then min(Tkey) = 50 seconds and max(Tkey) =
72 seconds. V can choose Tkey to be 55 seconds; as a result,
Nmsg = 184 messages.
7. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
7.1 Certificate lifetime and key set size
On one hand, the anonymous key set size should be small
to reduce storage space on vehicles. On the other hand, the
certificate lifetime should be short to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity window of the system if an anonymous public/private
key pair is compromised. Hence a tradeoff must be made
between the two.
7.1.1 Certificate lifetime
Each anonymous key should be used only with a sequence
of consecutive messages as described in Section 6.2, other-
wise a global attacker can extract information if a key is
reused, even on different days. The lifetime of certificates
should be short, around one day, to limit in time the effects
of key compromise. But the driving duration changes from
day to day (e.g., a long trip on vacation compared to daily
home-work-home trajectory), hence on some days a larger
number of keys may be required. To account for this, the
lifetime of a key certificate should be stretched over several
days (this is distinct from the usage duration of a key, which
is only several seconds and aims at protecting the privacy of
the key holder).
7.1.2 Anonymous key set size
Leveraging on the analysis in Section 6.2, a vehicle should
change its anonymous key only after having used it for a
certain number of messages. Reusing the example in 6.2, a
vehicle should change its key within an interval of around
1 min. If we assume that an average driver uses his car
2 hours per day, the number of required keys per year is
approximately 43800, which amounts to around 21 Mbytes
(assuming a storage space of 500 bytes per key, including
its certificate). To reduce the key storage space for govern-
mental transportation authorities, anonymous keys can be
derived from a master key shared between an authority and
the vehicle corresponding to the keys. When verifying vehi-
cle identities in liability-related situations, the keys can be
regenerated using the master key.
7.2 Estimation of the signature size
As we propose using a PKI for supporting security in
VANETs, it is important to choose a Public Key Cryptosys-
tem (PKCS) with an acceptable implementation overhead in
the vehicular context. According to DSRC, safety-related
messages are sent with a periodicity of 100 to 300 ms. This
imposes an upper bound on the processing time overhead;
this overhead is given as follows:
Toh(M) = Tsign(M) + Ttx(M |SigPrKV [M ]) + Tverify(M)
where Tsign(M), Ttx(M), and Tverify(M) are the necessary
durations to sign, transmit, and verify a message M , respec-
tively; SigPrKV [M ] is the signature of M by the sending ve-
hicle V and includes the CA’s certificate of the signing key.
The above expression reveals the two factors that affect the
choice of a particular PKCS: (1) the execution speeds of the
signature generation and the verification operations, and (2)
the key, signature, and certificate sizes.
Since the typical size of safety messages is between 100 and
200 bytes [32, 33], and the message is hashed before being
signed, the overhead is almost constant for a given PKCS.
Hence, it is possible to compare different options at least rel-
atively to each other (because the actual performance varies
with the platform, implementation, and version of the algo-
rithm).
In fact, there are several candidate PKCS (we consider
only the currently standardized systems) for implementing
the PKI in a VANET. To assure the future security of the
cryptographic material, and taking into account the deploy-
Table 2: Size and transmission time of PKCS
PKCS Sig size (bytes) Ttx(Sig) (ms)
RSA 256 0.171
ECDSA 28 0.019
NTRU 197 0.131
Table 3: Comparison of signature generation and
verification times on a memory-constrained Pentium
II 400 Mhz workstation
PKCS Generation (ms) Verification (ms)
ECDSA 3.255 7.617
NTRU 1.587 1.488
ment schedule of VANET technology, we assume a security
level at least equivalent to RSA 2048 according to the figures
provided by [21] (which is supposed to survive until 2030 [5])
and we list figures for public key and signature sizes [4]:
1. RSA Sign: the key and signature sizes are large (256
bytes).
2. ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography): it is more com-
pact than RSA (28 bytes), faster in signing but slower
in verification.
3. NTRUSign4 [4]: the key size is between the two above
(197 bytes), but it is much faster than the others in
both signing and verification.
Given that in DSRC the minimal data rate is 6 Mbps (for
safety messaging it is typically 12 Mbps), the transmission
overhead (at 12 Mbps) is acceptable in each of the above
options, as shown in Table 2.
Table 3 gives approximative execution times of signature
generation and verification for ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm) and NTRUSign. These figures are
derived from [4] and [8] and should be taken only as in-
dicative for the specific platform (Pentium II 400 Mhz with
memory constraints).
In conclusion, we can notice that in terms of performance,
ECDSA and NTRU outperform RSA. Compared to each
other, the advantage of ECDSA is its compactness, whereas
NTRU’s is its superior speed (the gain is approximately 2
in signing and 5 in verification [4]). The conclusive decision
should depend on case-specific evaluations (e.g., considering
the computing platforms that will be installed on vehicles
equipped with DSRC).
Recent advances in Merkle tree traversal [28] could also
open the possibility of using efficient Merkle authentication.
7.3 Is public key cryptography fit?
A typical criticism of public key cryptography in wireless
networks is that its overhead seriously affects the perfor-
mance of the system. This is particularly true for resource-
constrained devices, such as handhelds and sensors. But the
advantage of VANETs is that nodes are not anemic devices
but energy-rich nodes. As VANETs are still in the devel-
opment phase with a deployment schedule spanned over at
4The NTRU cryptosystem is recent and has so far undergone
considerable scrutiny. It is being standardized by the IEEE
P1363 Working Group (Standard Specifications For Public-
Key Cryptography).
least a decade, it is reasonable and necessary to consider the
future compatibility of the system. Next we provide perfor-
mance figures based on typical VANET scenarios and taking
the technology timeline into account.
Each message will contain a digital signature and a corre-
sponding certificate. ECC and NTRU are the most reason-
able PKCS candidates so far, hence we assume a signature
size between 28 bytes (ECDSA) and 197 bytes (NTRU).
We assume the safety message size (not considering cryp-
tographic material) to be around 200 bytes, including all
overheads. The resulting total message size (safety message
plus a digital signature plus a certificate, which contains a
public key and a signature) is between 284 and 791 bytes.
The second figure may be surprising at first, as the security
overhead is almost 3 times the message size. But it repre-
sents the upper bound on the total message overhead; below
we will show that even this overhead is acceptable. In fact,
if we compare the values in Tables 2 and 3, we can deduce
that the critical overhead of a given PKCS is the signature
verification time, since each vehicle will periodically receive
several messages that it needs to verify while it has to sign
and send only one message during the same period. The
use of smaller signature sizes (e.g., ECDSA) is also possible
with hardware accelerators.
7.3.1 Numerical upper bounds
We consider two scenarios (we assume upper bounds on
all values) with the basic protocol introduced in 3.2. The
channel capacity is typically 12 Mbps for safety messages
with a minimum of 6 Mbps.
1. A highway with 6 lanes (3 in each direction) of 3 m
each. We assume a uniform presence of vehicles, with
an inter-vehicle space of 30 m. Vehicles are mobile and
transmit DSRC messages every 300 ms over a 300 m
communication range. We consider a vehicle V located
in the middle of the highway, which corresponds to a
maximum of received messages; V can hear 120 vehi-
cles per 300 ms. In the worst-case, where all vehicles
contend for the channel, the system throughput is 2.53
Mbps (120 veh × 3.33 msg×sec/veh × 791 bytes/msg),
to be compared with the minimum nominal capacity of
DSRC, which is 6 Mbps. Before V can send a new mes-
sage, it should be able to process all incoming messages
within 300 ms. Assuming V receives all the 120 mes-
sages (although the average reception rate has recently
been evaluated to be significantly smaller than 1 [29]),
the maximum tolerable processing delay per message
is 300 ms/120 = 2.5 ms, a figure already achievable
(Table 3).
2. We consider the same highway as in the previous case
but this time vehicles are very slow or stopped (conges-
tion scenario) and spaced by 5 m (including the vehicle
length). Each vehicle transmits a safety message over
a range of 15 m every 100 ms. In this case, a vehicle V
can hear at most 36 other vehicles per 100 ms, which
amounts to a throughput of 2.28 Mbps (36 veh × 10
msg×sec/veh × 791 bytes/msg), which is also smaller
than the minimum 6 Mbps. The upper bound on the
processing delay per message, assuming V receives all
the messages, is 100 ms/36 = 2.78 ms, which is already
achievable.
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Figure 4: The effect of packet size on the VANET performance. All curves include a confidence interval of
95%
7.3.2 Simulations
To support the above numerical results, we have simulated
the above scenarios on the ns-2 simulator. We have used
the MAC (Medium Access Control) and PHY parameters of
IEEE 802.11a on which DSRC is based. Figure 4 shows the
message delay, the number of received messages per vehicle,
and the system throughput (total number of bits received
per vehicle) as functions of the total message size (including
the security overhead).
In Fig. 4(a), we can see that the average message delay
does not vary considerably when the message size increases
because the low contention on the medium and the high
transmission rate minimize the effect of the message size.
It is important to note that in Scenario 1, the maximum
message delay is smaller than 300 ms, which is the interval
between consecutive messages. In Scenario 2, the maximum
is smaller than 100 ms, the inter-message interval in this
case. Hence, the introduction of the cryptographic material
does not critically affect the message delay.
Fig. 4(b) shows the number of received messages per ve-
hicle as a function of the message size. We can see that the
maximum numbers of received messages are smaller than
the upper bounds provided in 7.3.1. The average actual
processing delays for a message of size 800 bytes are around
1s/75msg = 13.33 ms in Scenario 1 and 1s/60msg = 16.67
ms in Scenario 2, which are acceptable values. We can also
notice that large message sizes heavily increase message loss.
Finally, Fig. 4(c) shows that the system throughput in
both cases is smaller than the minimum available capacity
of 6Mbps. This is due to the message reception rate, which
is smaller than 1.
In practice, this overhead can be further reduced by using
the following optimizations:
1. V verifies a message only if its content is relevant (a
message can be read before verification since it is not
encrypted).
2. If V receives a message signed using a public key that
it had already verified (this is possible because anony-
mous keys are used for several messages before being
discarded), it has to verify only one signature. This is
a typical case in a congestion scenario.
To conclude, we believe that public key cryptography is
fit for vehicular networks. Given the above results, a PKCS
can be already used relying on current technology, but there
is ample space for optimization. Further advances in al-
gorithms, software, and hardware will increase the perfor-
mance and efficiency of the security functions.
8. DISCUSSION
A related topic that is worth considering is secure posi-
tioning. The most common approach to positioning vehi-
cles is by GPS. But this has several drawbacks, because the
precision of GPS is to the order of several meters and de-
grades in urban environments because of constructions such
as buildings and tunnels that weaken GPS signals. The
recently introduced DGPS solves the precision problem by
reducing the error to several centimeters [12]. GPS can also
be subject to a series of attacks such as signal jamming and
spoofing [30]. Some attempts have been made to correct this
problem [20], although no definitive solution is available yet.
A solution for secure positioning without GPS was proposed
in [9], but it is not adapted to VANETs.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explained why vehicular networks
need to be secured, and why this problem requires a specific
approach. We have proposed a model that identifies the
most relevant communication aspects; we have also iden-
tified the major threats. We have then proposed a secu-
rity architecture along with the related protocols; we have
shown how and to what extent it protects privacy. Finally,
we have analyzed the robustness of our proposal, and we
have assessed its performance. We have shown that public
key cryptography is fit for the considered problem.
To our best knowledge, this is the first paper addressing
the security of vehicular networks in a systematic and quan-
tified way.
In terms of future work, we intend to further develop this
proposal. In particular, we intend to explore in more de-
tail the respective merits of key distribution by the manu-
facturers or by governmental bodies; we will also perform
additional numerical evaluations of the solutions.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Imad Aad, Levente Buttyan, Mario
Cagalj, Markus Jakobsson, Daniel Jungels, Tim Leinmueller,
and Christof Paar for their helpful feedback on earlier ver-
sions of this work.
10. REFERENCES
[1] http://www.car-2-car.org/.
[2] http://www.network-on-wheels.de/.
[3] 5.9 GHz DSRC.
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc32/dsrc/.
[4] http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/working
group/presentations/ntrusignparams-1363-0411.pdf.
[5] http://www.rsasecurity.com.
[6] Wave Systems Corp. EMBASSY 2100 cryptographic
controller.
http://www.wave.com/about/datasheets/03-
000139 EMBASSY2100.pdf.
[7] Jeremy Blum and Azim Eskandarian. The threat of
intelligent collisions. IT Professional, 6(1):24–29,
Jan.-Feb. 2004.
[8] Michael Brown, Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lo´pez, and
Alfred Menezes. Software implementation of the NIST
elliptic curves over prime fields. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 2020:250–265, 2001.
[9] S. Capkun and J.P. Hubaux. Secure positioning of
wireless devices with application to sensor networks.
In IEEE INFOCOM, 2005.
[10] Sastry Duri, Marco Gruteser, Xuan Liu, Paul
Moskowitz, Ronald Perez, Moninder Singh, and
Jung-Mu Tang. Framework for security and privacy in
automotive telematics. In Proceedings of the 2nd
international workshop on Mobile commerce, pages
25–32. ACM Press, 2002.
[11] Stephan Eichler, Jerome Billion, Robert Maier,
Hans-Jrg Vgel, and Rainer Kroh. On providing
security for an open telematics platform. In 5th
International Conference on ITS Telecommunications,
2005.
[12] Per Enge. Retooling the Global Positioning System.
Scientific American, May 2004.
[13] Wilfried Enkelmann. FleetNet - applications for
inter-vehicle communication. In IEEE Intelligent
Vehicles Symposium, pages 162–167, June 2003.
[14] Igor Furgel and Kerstin Lemke. A review of the digital
tachograph system. In Workshop on Embedded
IT-Security in Cars (escar), 2004.
[15] Lutz Gollan and Christoph Meinel. Digital signatures
for automobiles. In Systemics, Cybernetics and
Informatics (SCI), 2002.
[16] Philippe Golle, Dan Greene, and Jessica Staddon.
Detecting and correcting malicious data in VANETs.
In Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Vehicular
ad hoc networks, pages 29–37. ACM Press, 2004.
[17] Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, and David Johnson.
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad
hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 8th annual
international conference on Mobile computing and
networking, pages 12–23. ACM Press, 2002.
[18] Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Srdjan Capkun, and Jun Luo.
The security and privacy of smart vehicles. IEEE
Security and Privacy Magazine, 2(3):49–55, May-June
2004.
[19] Markus Jakobsson. Privacy vs. Authenticity. PhD
thesis, University of California at San Diego, 1997.
[20] Markus G. Kuhn. An asymmetric security mechanism
for navigation signals. In Sixth Information Hiding
Workshop, 2004.
[21] A. K. Lenstra and E. R. Verheul. Selecting
cryptographic key sizes. Journal of Cryptology,
14(4):255293, 2001.
[22] Matthias Lott, Rudiger Halfmann, Egon Schultz, and
Markus Radimirsch. Medium access and radio
resource management for ad hoc networks based on
UTRA TDD. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking
& computing, pages 76–86. ACM Press, 2001.
[23] Kirsten Matheus, Rolf Morich, Ingrid Paulus,
Cornelius Menig, Andreas Lbke, Bernd Rech, and Will
Specks. Car-to-car communication - market
introduction and success factors. In ITS 2005: 5th
European Congress and Exhibition on Intelligent
Transport Systems and Services, 2005.
[24] Adrian Perrig and J.D. Tygar. Secure Broadcast
Communication in Wired and Wireless Networks.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
[25] Peter Samuel. Of sticker tags and 5.9GHz. ITS
International, 2004.
[26] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications
of the ACM, 22(11):612–613, 1979.
[27] D. Shaw and W. Kinsner. Multifractal modelling of
radio transmitter transients for classification. In
WESCANEX 97: Communications, Power and
Computing, 1997.
[28] Michael Szydlo. Merkle tree traversal in log space and
time. In Eurocrypt, 2004.
[29] Marc Torrent-Moreno, Daniel Jiang, and Hannes
Hartenstein. Broadcast reception rates and effects of
priority access in 802.11-based vehicular ad-hoc
networks. In VANET ’04: Proceedings of the first
ACM workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks, pages
10–18. ACM Press, 2004.
[30] Jon S. Warner and Roger G. Johnston. Think GPS
cargo tracking = high security? Think again.
Technical report, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
2003.
[31] Marko Wolf, Andre´ Weimerskirch, and Christof Paar.
Security in automotive bus systems. In Workshop on
Embedded IT-Security in Cars (escar), 2004.
[32] Qing Xu, Tony Mak, Jeff Ko, and Raja Sengupta.
Vehicle-to-vehicle safety messaging in DSRC. In
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Vehicular
ad hoc networks, pages 19–28. ACM Press, 2004.
[33] Xue Yang, Jie Liu, Feng Zhao, and Nitin Vaidya. A
vehicle-to-vehicle communication protocol for
cooperative collision warning. In First Annual
International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous
Systems: Networking and Services (MobiQuitous
2004), August 2004.
[34] Magda El Zarki, Sharad Mehrotra, Gene Tsudik, and
Nalini Venkatasubramanian. Security issues in a
future vehicular network. In European Wireless, 2002.
[35] Peifang Zheng. Tradeoffs in certificate revocation
schemes. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.,
33(2):103–112, 2003.
